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Interest Rate Rules, Target Policies, and Endogenous Economic Growth 
in an Open Economy 
 
 
Abstract  This paper sets up an endogenous growth model of an open economy in which the monetary 
authority implements a gradualist interest-rate rule with targets for inflation and economic growth.    We show 
that, under a passive rule, a monetary equilibrium exists and is unique; moreover, the equilibrium is locally 
determinate.  Under an active rule, the open economy either generates multiple equilibria or does not have 
any equilibrium.    If equilibria exist, the high-growth equilibrium is locally determinate while the low-growth 
equilibrium is a source.  Besides these, the stabilization and growth effects of alternative target policies are 
also explored in this study.   
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Interest Rate Rules, Target Policies, and Endogenous Economic Growth 
in an Open Economy 
 
1. Introduction 
Price stability and economic growth have long been two of the policy authorities’ 
goals.    Due to international financial innovation and erratic money demand, policymakers 
in many industrial and developing countries have put monetary aggregates aside and have 
instead used interest rates as the main monetary  policy  instrument.  In practice, the use of 
interest rates as the policy instrument has often taken place in conjunction with certain 
targets for inflation and other measures of economic activity.  As proposed by Taylor 
(1993), U.S. monetary policy over the past decade may be described in terms of an 
interest-rate feedback rule, whereby the federal funds rate is set as a linear function of 
inflation and output gaps with coefficients of 1.5 and 0.5, respectively.  Such an 
interest-rate rule has been dubbed the Taylor rule.
1  This rule describes U.S. policy in a 
period in which monetary policy is widely judged to have been unusually successful 
(Taylor (1999)), suggesting that the rule is worth adopting as a principle of behavior.  In 
fact, such rules have also been shown to adequately describe monetary policies in many 
other industrialized economies (see, for example, Clarida et al., 2000).     
The debate of whether interest-rate rules can contribute to aggregate stability has a 
long history.  Research on this issue can be traced back to the studies of Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1981).  In their studies with somewhat ad hoc 
specifications, the stabilization effect of interest-rate rules basically involves examining 
whether interest rate rules can give rise to the determinacy of the price level.    Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) claim that interest-rate rules are undesirable, because they lead to the 
indeterminacy of the rational-expectations equilibrium price level.  However, McCallum 
(1981) argues that determinacy is possible if the interest rate feeds back to endogenous 
state variables such as the price level.     
                                                 
1 To be concrete, a feedback rule satisfies the Taylor principle if it has an inflation coefficient greater than 
unity, which implies that, in the event of a sustained increase in the inflation rate by k percent, the nominal 
interest rate will eventually be raised by more than k percent.  In the relevant literature, such kinds of 
interest-rate rules are also known as active interest-rate rules.  By contrast, a passive rule involves an 
inflation coefficient of less than unity.      
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Interest in this issue has been renewed by Taylor’s (1993) work.  Ever since his 
pioneering effort, there have been numerous optimizing models that have focused on the 
indeterminacy of equilibrium under interest-rate rules.  The results they obtain are, 
however, inconclusive.  A number of studies, for instance, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), 
Woodford (1994), Shmitt-Grohé and Uribr (2000), and Clarida et al. (2000), suggest that 
Taylor rules can ensure uniqueness of equilibrium.  However, other works, such as 
Benhabib et al. (2001a, 2001b, and 2002), Dupor (2001, 2002), and Meng (2002), show 
that active rules do not necessarily give rise to the determinacy of equilibrium while 
passive rules are generally determinate.  Generally speaking, the stabilization effect of 
interest-rate feedback rules is shown to depend crucially on the way in which money 
affects aggregate demand and supply, the monetary-fiscal regime, the existence of capital 
accumulation, the adjustment costs of investment, the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, and the steady-state inflation rate, etc. 
Two potentially important issues are still unheralded in the literature.  First, as a 
consequence of globalization, the frequent interactions among economies raise the 
importance of the role of international factors in relation to domestic macroeconomic 
performance.  However, with a few exceptions (Taylor, 2001; McCallum and Nelson, 
2001; Erceg (2002)), economists have paid relatively little attention to the discussion 
regarding the performance of interest-rate rules in an open economy.  Secondly, due to 
their non-growth analytical frameworks, the authors we cited above also do not deal with 
the problem of whether or not the government can influence the economic growth rate 
while pursuing price stability.  Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to construct a 
monetary endogenous growth model of an open-economy and use it to explore the 
stabilization and growth effects of interest-rate rules.     
When specifying the monetary rule, we actualize the central bank’s operating 
procedure in that it is assumed to implement a gradualist monetary rule, i.e. it gradually 
adjusts the nominal interest rate toward the targeted level, rather than adjusting the interest 
rate by an immediate once-and-for-all jump.  As is commonly believed by economists, 
this is the way several central bankers have conducted their monetary policy.  Such a 
belief is supported by evidence that the official interest rates in major countries have been 
adjusted by small amounts with infrequent reversals (see, for example, Goodhart (1996), 
Sack (1998), Woodford (1999), and Martin (1999)).  In addition, from an empirical point 
of view, a central banker’s first mission is to keep inflation stable; however, it is also to 
keep an eye on real GDP growth (or other macroeconomic goals).  To incorporate this  
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observation into the model, following Smithin (2002), we postulate that the central bank 
sets the federal funds rate as a function of inflation and growth gaps and accordingly, the 
central bank is pursuing both inflation and growth stabilization goals.     
Our findings provide some important policy implications and contribute to the 
relevant literature in two respects.  First of all, we reexamine the indeterminacy results 
under interest-rate feedback rules.    It is found in an open economy that, if the central bank 
implements a passive rule, then the monetary equilibrium exists and is unique.    Moreover, 
this unique passive monetary equilibrium is locally determinate.  If the central bank 
implements an active rule, then the open economy either generates multiple equilibria or 
does not have any equilibrium.  If equilibria exist, the high-growth equilibrium is locally 
determinate while the low-growth equilibrium is a source.     
Second, this paper investigates the effects of alternative government target policies on 
the dynamic performance of a continually growing economy.  We show that, in response 
to an anticipated permanent decrease in the inflation target, the growth rate of the open 
economy will decline on impact and then continuously fall toward its new stationary level.   
However, the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate will exhibit a mis-adjustment: they 
will fall during the period between the policy’s announcement and its implementation; once 
the lower inflation target is realized, the nominal interest and inflation rates will start to 
increase toward their new and higher stationary levels. 
This paper also considers an incredible rise in the growth target.  The practical 
observations have pointed out that the central bank’s policy often involves some kind of 
credibility problem and it has also received a considerable amount of attention in the 
literature (see, for instance, Calvo, 1986; Drazen and Helpman, 1988).    The results that we 
yield show that the economy can enjoy higher growth during the entire transition if the 
commitment in regard to the growth target policy is imperfectly credible.    This provides a 
theoretical explanation of why the government often overstates its intended growth target 
and implements an incredible policy.  However, in response to different credibility 
horizons, the economy will experience quite distinct transitional dynamics.  Generally 
speaking, the results of this study suggest that a nominal interest rate rule that feeds back to 
both inflation and economic growth can give rise to a double-dividend in terms of both 
price stability and the expansion of economic growth in the steady state.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 develops a small open 
endogenously-growing model with gradualist nominal interest rate rules.    In Section 3 we 
characterize the  balanced growth path and the stability properties of the system.  The  
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economy’s dynamic response to the target policies is analyzed in Section 4.  Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. The model 
Consider a small open economy consisting of a representative household, a 
government, and a central bank.    The domestic economy produces and consumes a single 
traded good, and the foreign price of which is given in the world market.  In the absence 
of any impediments to trade, the law of one price is assumed to hold.    By denoting  P  as 
the domestic price level, 
* P  as the world price level, and  E  as the nominal exchange 
rate, the law of one price can be described in percentage change terms as follows: 
  ε π π + =
* , (1) 
where ) / (   P P & ≡ π  is the rate of inflation of the good in terms of domestic currency, 
) / (
* * * P P & ≡ π  is the rate of inflation of the good in terms of foreign currency, and 
) / (   E E & ≡ ε   is the rate of depreciation of domestic currency. 
 
2.1 The household   
The representative household with an infinite planning horizon has access to perfect 
world capital markets, being able to lend internationally.  Let us denote  M  and 
* B  as 
the stocks of nominal money balances and net nominal foreign bonds, respectively.  The 
net nominal foreign bond earns a fixed rate of return, namely, the world nominal interest 
rate, 
* R , in the world bond market.  When the world capital market is perfect, the 
following assets arbitrage condition must hold:     
  π π − = − R R
* * , (2) 
where  R   is defined as the domestic nominal interest rate.    Equation (2) is essentially the 
interest rate parity.  The household chooses consumption c , investment i , physical 
capital k, real money balances  ) / (   P M m ≡ , and real net foreign bonds  ) / (  
* * P EB b ≡  so 
as to maximize the discounted sum of future instantaneous utilities: 

















c t  
where  ρ  represents the constant rate of time preference and θ  is the inverse of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution which measures the curvature of the utility function.   
For simplicity, the individual’s labor supply is assumed to be fixed inelastically.      
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The domestic output y is produced by means of a simple  Ak  production  technology, 
i.e.  Ak y = , where k  denotes the domestic capital stock (it can also be treated as a 
composite of physical and human capital, as suggested by Lucas (1988)) and  0 > A  is  the 
total  factor  productivity.  The  process by which the firm sells its product to the consumers 
involves transactions cost.  Firms, as argued by Dornbusch and Frenkel (1973), hold 
money balances in order to facilitate transactions.  Following Sims (1989) and Zhang 
(1996), we summarize the transactions cost technology in terms of the rate of loss in real 
output using the following form: 
 ) , ( y m Φ = Φ , with  0 < Φ m  and  0 > Φ y .   
To sustain a macroeconomic equilibrium with ongoing growth, we further assume that  Φ 
is homogeneous of degree 0 in m  and  y ; more specifically,  ) / ( ) , ( y m y m φ = Φ  with 
0 < ′ φ , 0 ≥ ′ ′ φ ,  1 ) / ( lim
0 / =
→ y m
y m φ , and  ) 1 , 0 ( ) / ( lim
/ ∈ =
∞ → φ φ y m
y m . 
Furthermore, in line with Hayashi (1982), Abel and Blanchard (1983), and Turnovsky 
(1996), the accumulation of physical capital involves adjustment costs  Ψ  (or installation 
costs) with a quadratic convex function, i.e.: 
     ),
2
1 (   )   , (
k
i h
i k i + = Ψ  
where h ) 0 (>  is a constant parameter of adjustment costs.  The existence of adjustment 
costs for investment can help us avoid some of the counterfactual results from the 
open-economy version of the Ramsey model (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 3)).  
Turnovsky (2000) points out that the linear homogeneity of the adjustment cost function is 
necessary to give rise to non-degenerate dynamics and to be sustained if the stationary 
equilibrium exhibits ongoing growth.
2  Given that the capital stock does not depreciate, 
the following physical capital accumulation constraint should be satisfied.     
  & k i = . (3) 
At each instant of time, the representative household is bound by a flow constraint 
linking wealth accumulation to any difference between its gross income and its expenditure.   
Thus, the household’s flow budget constraint is given by:     
                                                 
2 Adjustment costs that depend upon investment relative to the capital stock can be justified by 
learning-by-doing in the installation process.  As addressed by Feichtinger et al. (2001, p. 255), “if capital 
stock is large, a lot of machines have been installed in the past so that this firm has a lot of experience, 
implying that it is more efficient in installing new machines.”  
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i c y b m
* * *   ] [ ) ( )
2
1 ( & & , (4) 
where the  τ  are real transfers from the government.  Equation (4) states that, if the sum 
of output, interest income on net foreign bonds, and transfer income from the government 
exceeds that of expenditure on consumption, investment, transactions cost, and inflation tax, 
then the representative agent will increase his holdings of either real money balances or 
real net foreign bonds.     
If we denote the real financial asset as 
* b m a + ≡ , then the current-value Hamiltonian 
for the representative agent’s optimization is given by:     





i c Ak a R
c
H ⋅ ′ +  

 















where  λ   is the shadow value (marginal utility) of wealth in the form of the real financial 
asset and  q′  is the shadow value of capital stock.    Let the shadow value of wealth be the 
numéraire.  Accordingly,  λ / q q ′ ≡  is defined as the market value of capital in terms of 
the (unitary) price of the real financial asset.     
The optimum conditions necessary for this optimization are: 
  λ
θ =
























] ) ( ) ( 1 [
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  ) (
* * π ρ
λ
λ
− − = R
&
, (9) 
together with (3) and (4), and the transversality conditions of  a and k  are: 





ρ λ , (10a) 








t qk k q
ρ ρ λ . (10b) 
Equation (5) indicates that the household equates the marginal utility of consumption 
to the marginal utility of the real financial asset.    Equation (6) states the “Tobin q” theory 
of investment.  Equation (7) indicates that the marginal benefit of holding real money 
balances equals the domestic nominal interest rate.    Equation (8) is an arbitrage condition, 
which indicates that the real rate of return on marginal investment should equal the real rate  
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of return on the real financial asset.  The former is the sum of expected capital gains, 
q q/ & , the value of the marginal product of capital, and the value of marginal savings on 
installation  costs.   
 
2.2 The government and the central bank 
There are no commercial banks in the economy and thus the central bank lends only to 
the government.    Under a regime of flexible exchange rates, foreign reserves are constant 
over time.    Following Agénor and Montiel (1996, pp. 323-326), we normalize the constant 
level of reserves to zero.  Accordingly, given that D is the nominal stock of domestic 
credit, changes in the real money balances are equal to changes in the real credit stock, i.e.:   
  π µ − = = d d m m / / & & ,   (11) 
where ) / (   P D d ≡  is the real domestic credit and  ) / (   D D & ≡ µ  is the growth rate of the 
nominal credit stock.    In addition, let us assume that the government forgoes the issuance 
of domestic bonds to finance its deficit, and distributes seigniorage to the representative 
household as a transfer payment in a lump-sum manner.    Thus, the flow budget constraint 
of the government can be written as: 
  m µ τ = , (12) 
Putting equations (4), (11), and (12) together, the open economy’s consolidated budget 
constraint can be obtained as follows: 
 
* * * *   ) ( )
2






b π φ − + + − − − = & . (13) 
Equation (13) indicates that the economy’s accumulation of net foreign bonds is equal to 
the current account balance, which in turn equals the balance of trade plus the interest 
payment on net foreign bonds. 
Assume that the central bank has an implicit “intermediate target”  R   and follows an 
interest rate feedback rule.
3    In line with Smithin (2002), we further specify the monetary 
policy rule as follows: 
  )   ( ) ( 0 γ γ α π π α α γ π − + − + = R , (14) 
where  0 α  is the constant intercept term and π  and γ  represent the targets for the 
inflation rate and economic growth rate set by the monetary authorities, respectively.    The 
                                                 
3  The intermediate target will be associated with an “operating target” level for the federal funds rate.  
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coefficients 0 > π α  and  0 > γ α  measure the extent of the central bank’s response to the 
inflation gap and the growth gap, respectively.  Following Leeper (1991), Meng (2002), 
Benhabib et al. (2001b), and Dupor (2001), we refer to monetary policy as passive if 
1 < π α   and as active if  1 > π α .   
In line with the way in which central bankers in many countries practically conduct 
their monetary policy (see Woodford, 1999), the interest rate rule is implemented gradually.   
Under such a gradualist monetary rule, the central bank implements a partial adjustment in 
the nominal interest rate toward the targeted level  R , rather than adjusting the interest rate 
by an immediate once-and-for-all jump.    This causes the nominal interest rate to move in a 
particular direction over sustained periods of time.  Following Goodhart (1996), Sack 
(1998), and Woodford (1999), we capture this gradual behavior by specifying that the 
nominal interest rate follows a law of motion as in the following form: 
  ) ( R R R − ⋅ − = δ & , (15) 
where the coefficient  ) 0 (> δ   measures the degree of inertia in the central bank’s response.   
Equation (15) indicates that the change in the nominal interest rate only partially offsets a 
deviation from the targeted rate, with the lagged change in the interest rate exerting a 
significant effect on the dynamics.  At each instant of time, the central bank adjusts the 
credit supply to whatever level is needed for the actual interest rate  R  to  prevail.   
Given the international financial assets arbitrage condition in (2) and the nominal 
interest rate rule in (14), (15) can be rewritten as: 
  )   ( )] ( ) [( ) (
* *
0 γ γ δα π π δα α δ γ π − ⋅ + − − − ⋅ + − ⋅ − = R R R R & . (16) 
Equation (16) highlights the importance of the international real interest spread in 
determining the behavior of the nominal interest rate in an open economy.   
 
3. Balanced growth path and stability properties 
Differentiating (5) with respect to time and plugging the resulting equation into (9), 
the optimal change in consumption is derived as: 





≡ − − = ) (
1 * * &
. (17) 
This is a standard Keynes-Ramsey rule, which indicates that consumption rises (falls) as 
the real rate of return on the real financial asset 
* * π − R   exceeds (falls short of) the rate of 
time preference  ρ .  
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Moreover, from the optimal condition for holdings of real money balances (7), the real 
balances-output ratio can be derived as: 
 ) ( / R v y m ≡ ; 0 / 1 / < ′ ′ − = ∂ ∂ ≡ ′ φ R v v . 
Substituting the above equation into (8), the evolution of the market value of capital q can 








+ ⋅ ′ + − − − =
h
q







)] ( )) ( ( )) ( ( 1 [
1
2
* * φ φ π
&
. (8a) 
In order to satisfy the household’s intertemporal budget constraint, given that q 
exponentially approaches to  q ~ along the transitional adjustment path, the transversality 
condition (10b) holds if and only if:
4 
 







where  q ~  is the stationary value of  q, which is determined below.    Equation (18) shows 
that in the long run the rate of capital growth is less than the real rate of return on the real 
financial  asset.   
We now turn to the evolution of the output growth rate.  Given the Ak production 
function and by combining the definition  y y/ & ≡ γ   with (6), we have: 
  h q k k y y / ) 1 ( / / − = = ≡ & & γ . (19) 
Differentiating (19) with respect to time and combining the resulting equation with (8a), the 
change in the output growth rate is derived as: 
 
2





φ φ γ π γ − ⋅ ′ + − − + − = =
h
A





& . (20) 
Equations (16) and (20) construct a  2 2×   ) , ( R γ  dynamic  system.  Recursively,  the 
evolution of q, ) / (
∗ ∗ ≡ ∗ b b
b
& γ  and  ) / ( m m m & ≡ γ  can be determined.
5  It should be noted 
                                                 
4 Solving (6) and (9) yields  ] d   / ) 1 ( exp[ ) (
 
0   0 ξ ∫ − =
t
h q k t k  and  ] ) ( exp[ ) (
* *
0 t R t t π ρ λ λ − − = , where  0 λ  
is the endogenously-determined initial marginal utility of wealth and  0 k   is a given initial stock of domestic 
capital.  Equipped  with  ) (t k  and  ) (t λ , (10b) is rewritten as: 




  = − − − ⋅ = ∫ ∞ →
−




t R h q q k k q . 
This implies that the relationship reported in (18) is true.      
5  Differentiating (7) with respect to time and combining the resulting equation with (16) and (19), the optimal 
change in  m is  expressed  as:  
  0 0
* *
0 / } )   ( ] ) ( [ ) ( { / v R R R m m φ γ γ δα π π δα α δ γ γ π ′ ′ − ⋅ − − − − ⋅ − − ⋅ + = & , 
where  0 φ ′ ′  and  0 v  are the endogenously-determined initial values of φ ′ ′  and  v , respectively.  In  
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that the transversality condition (10a) is distinct from (10b).  Combining (17) with 
λ λ θ / / & & − = c c  gives the no-Ponzi-game condition  0 ] ) ( exp[   lim
* * * = − −
∞ → t R b
t π .  Thus, 
following Turnovsky (1996, 1997), the transversality condition (10a) must be satisfied and 










− − ′ ⋅













h q A k
b R c c , (21a) 
  c R γ π > −
* * , (21b) 
  h q R / ) 1 ~ ( ~ * * − ≡ > − γ π , (21c) 
where  A′   is defined as  )) ( 1 ( 0 v A φ −  with  0 v   denoting the initial real money 
balances-output ratio,  γ ~ is the stationary value of the output growth rate, and  0
~ γ  is the 
initial equilibrium value of γ .   Equation (21a) determines the feasible initial level of 
real consumption.  Equation (21b) imposes an upper bound on the consumption growth 
rate.  Equation  (21c)  is  equivalent to equation (18).     
We are ready to analyze the equilibrium characteristic of the dynamic system to which 
we now turn.  At the steady-growth equilibrium, the economy is characterized by 
0 ) ( = = = q R & & & γ  and  R  and  γ  are at their stationary values, namely R
~
 and  γ ~ , 
respectively.  It  then  follows  from equations (7) and (19) that  ) / 1 ~ ( ~ ~ ~ ~ h q y k m − = = = = γ γ γ γ  
should hold, meaning that, along the balanced growth path, real money balances, physical 
capital, and real output grow at the same rate  γ ~.
7   
It follows from (16) and (20) that the steady-state values R
~
 and γ ~ satisfy the 
following stationary relationships: 
                                                                                                                                            
addition, from (2) and (11) the growth rate of the nominal credit stock is derived as: 
  0 0
* *
0
* * / } )   ( ] ) ( [ ) ( { ) ( v R R R R R φ γ γ δα π π δα α δ π γ µ γ π ′ ′ − ⋅ − − − − ⋅ − − ⋅ + − − + = . 
6 From the assumption of Ak production technology and  0 = R &  in the steady state, we learn that  y ,  k , 
and  m grow at the same rate.  By substituting  ) (t c  in (17) and  i   and  ) (t k  in (14) into (13), we have: 
= ) (







* * * ) 2 / 1 (   ) (
γ γ γ γ γ π ⋅ + − − ′ + − .  Given an initial stock 
*
0 b , we solve this 
differential equation for  { } ] d )] 2 / ) 1 (( [   [ ) (  
  
0    0 0
2 *
0
) ( * * * *
∫ ⋅ − − − ′ + =
− − t r t R e e c e k h q A b e t b
c ξ
ς ξ γ ξ γ π .  
Substituting the above expressions of  ) (
* t b  and  ) (t λ  in (9) into (10a), (21) thus can be derived.  See 
Turnovsky (1996) for details. 
7 From (17), the stationary growth rate of real consumption is  θ ρ π γ / ) ( ~ * * − − = R c .  In addition, 
analogous to Turnovsky (1996), the rate of growth of net real foreign bonds  ∗ b γ   converges asymptotically to 
) ~ , ~ ( c y max γ γ .   
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( ( 1 [ )
1 ~ ( ) (
2
* * = − ⋅ ′ + − − + −
γ
φ φ γ π
h
A
R v R v R v
h
R . (20a) 
As depicted in Figure 1, the loci  0 = R &  and  0 = γ&  trace all combinations of  γ ~ and R  
that satisfy equations (16a) and (20a), respectively.  When the central bank implements a 
passive monetary rule ( 1 < π α ), 0 = R &  is upward sloping in the  ) , ( R γ  space, while it is 
downward sloping when the monetary rule is active ( 1 > π α ).  The locus  0 = γ&  is a 
convex curve with a negative slope since the transversality condition must hold.
8  
Referring to panel A of Figure 1, if the central bank implements a passive interest rate rule, 
then there exists only one intersection, namely  0 Q , of loci  0 = R &  and  0 = γ& .  However, 
if the central bank implements an active interest rate rule, there are either two intersections, 
namely  0 Q  and  0 Q′, or no intersection, between loci  0 = R &  and  0 = γ& , as displayed in 
panel B of Figure 1.    These results lead us to establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  If the central bank implements a passive interest rate rule ( 1 < π α ), then 
the monetary equilibrium of the open economy exists and is unique.  However, if the 
central bank implements an active interest rate rule ( 1 > π α ), the open economy either 
generates multiple equilibria or does not have any equilibrium.     
Next, based on (16) and (20), we identify the local stability properties of these 
equilibria presented above.  First of all, we linearize the dynamic system  ) , ( R γ  around 
the steady state and derive: 









γ π −  

 
 − −  

 





− ⋅ =  

 



















and  0 ~ * * > − − ≡ γ π η R  is required by (21c).  Let  1 s  and  2 s  be the two characteristic 
roots of the Jacobian matrix  J  in (22).  It follows from (22) that the trace and the 
                                                 
8 From (16a), we have  0 ) 1 /( /
0 <
> − = ∂ ∂
= π γ α α γ
R R &  as  1 >
<
π α  and  0 /
0
2 2 = ∂ ∂
= R R & γ .  From (20a), we 
have  0 ) / /( ) ~ ( /
* *
0 < − − − = ∂ ∂
= h Av R R γ π γ
γ&  and  ) / /( )} / ( ) ~ ( 1 { /
2 2 * *
0
2 2 h Av Av h v R R ′ − − − = ∂ ∂
= γ π γ
γ  
0 > .  
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determinant of  J , respectively, are: 
  0 ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 <
> − − = + ≡ π α δ η s s J Tr , (23a) 
  0 ] / ) 1 [( ) ( 2 1 >
< + − − = = ∆ ≡ h vA s s J Det γ π α η α δ . (23b) 
It is easy to learn from (23) that, when the central bank implements a passive rule ( 1 < π α ), 
the Jacobian matrix  J  has two real roots with opposite signs since  0 < ∆ .  Moreover, 
because the dynamic system reported in (22) has one jump variable  γ  and one gradual 
adjustment variable  R , it thus exhibits saddle-point stability.  As a result, the unique 
passive steady-state equilibrium  0 Q   depicted in panel A of Figure 1 is locally determinate 
and there exists a unique growth path converging to it. 
By contrast, when the central bank implements an active rule ( 1 > π α ), we have 
0 ) ( > J Tr  and  0 >
< ∆  from (23).  In this case, the two real roots of J  either have 
opposite signs or are both positive.  Furthermore, the sign of ∆ is either negative or 
positive, depending on whether locus  0 = R &  is steeper or flatter than locus  0 = γ&  at the 
steady-state equilibrium (if equilibria exist).
9    Accordingly, we can conclude that under an 
active rule the equilibrium with higher growth, such as  0 Q  in panel B of Figure 1, is a 
saddle and thus is locally determinate, whereas the equilibrium with lower growth, such as 
0 Q′  in panel B of Figure 1, is a source.    To sum up, we have: 
 
Proposition 2:  Under a passive monetary rule, the unique monetary equilibrium of the 
open economy is locally determinate.  Under an active monetary rule, the high-growth 
equilibrium is locally determinate, while the low-growth equilibrium is a source.     
 
4. Transitional dynamics and target policies 
  In this section we discuss the economic performance in the face of different target 
policies.  To make the analysis meaningful, in what follows we only focus on the case 
where there are stable equilibria, i.e. point  0 Q   in both panel A and panel B of Figure 1.     
                                                 
9  Given  0 ) 1 /( /
0 < − = ∂ ∂
= π γ α α γ
R R &  and  0 ) / /( /
0 < − = ∂ ∂
= h Av R η γ
γ& , (23b) can be rewritten as 
0 ] / / [ ) / )( 1 (
0 0 >
< ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ⋅ − − = ∆
= = γ π γ γ α δ
& & R R h vA
R .  Under an active monetary rule, the sign of ∆  is 
equal to that of 
0 0 / /
= = ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
γ γ γ
& & R R
R .  
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For expository convenience, we assume that  2 1 0 s s < < .  It follows from (22) that 
the general solutions for  R  and γ  are,  respectively: 
 
t s t s e B e B R t R
2 1
2 1 ) , (
~
) ( + + = γ π , (24a) 
 



















γ π γ γ , (24b) 
where  1 B  and  2 B  are unknown parameters.  Based on (24a) and (24b), in Figure 2 we 
show two cases: Panel A presents the case of a passive monetary rule ( 0 = R &  is upward 
sloping), while Panel B presents the case of an active monetary rule ( 0 = R &  is downward 
sloping).  As indicated by the direction of the arrows in Figure 2, the loci SS and UU 
represent the stable and unstable branches, respectively.    Evidently, the convergent saddle 
path SS is downward sloping, while the divergent branch UU is upward sloping.
10   
Since the dynamic behavior of the economy around the stable equilibrium in 
association with both passive and active rules will experience very similar transitional 
dynamics, in this section we only focus on the case of the active rule and abstract the case 
of the passive rule.  The detailed analysis concerning the case of the passive rule is 
available upon request from the authors.     
 
4.1 Anticipated reduction in the inflation target 
Assume that at the “present” time  0 = t  the central bank pre-announces that its 
inflation target will decrease from  0 π  to  ) ( 0 1 π π <  at a specific future date  T t = .  In 
Figure 3, the initial equilibrium is established at  0 Q , where the  0 = γ&  locus intersects 
) ( 0 0 π = R & .  The corresponding initial rates of growth and nominal interest are  0
~ γ  and 
0
~
R , respectively.  Upon an anticipated permanent decrease in the inflation target, the 
0 = γ&   locus remains intact, while  ) ( 0 0 π = R &  shifts  upward  to  ) ( 0 1 π = R & .
11  A s   a   r e s u l t ,  
the new steady-growth equilibrium is at point  1 Q , with γ  and R  being  1
~ γ  and  1
~
R , 
respectively.   
                                                 
10 Given  0 2 = B  and  0 1 = B  in (24), we have  ) / /( ) ( ] ) 1 ( /[ / 1 1 h vA s s R
SS − − = + − = ∂ ∂ η α δ δα γ π γ  and 
) / /( ) ( ] ) 1 ( /[ / 2 2 h vA s s R
UU − − = + − = ∂ ∂ η α δ δα γ π γ .  Because  0 1 > − s η  and  0 2 < −s η ,  SS is 
downward sloping, while UU is upward sloping.     
11 It is clear from (16) and (20) that  0 ) 1 /( 1 /
0 > − = ∂ ∂
= π α π
R R &  and  0 / 0= ∂ ∂ = γ π & R  due to  1 > π α  under 
the active monetary rule.  
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Before we proceed to study the dynamic adjustment, three points should be addressed.   
First, we denote 
+ 0  as the instant after the announcement is made by the central bank, as 
well as 
− T  and 
+ T  as the respective instants before and after policy implementation.  
Second, during the dates between 
+ 0  and 
− T , the inflation target has not yet been 
reduced and thus point  0 Q   should be treated as the reference point to govern the dynamic 
adjustment.  Third, as the inflation target decreases from  0 π  to  1 π  at the moment 
+ T , 
the economy should move to a point exactly on the stable branch SS at that instant of time 
to ensure that the system will converge. 
Based on the above information, Figure 3 reveals that, at the instant the policy 
announcement is made, the economy will jump from point  0 Q  to  + 0 Q  on impact.  
Notice that since the central bank implements a gradual adjustment in the interest rate, the 
nominal interest rate will remain intact at the original level  0
~
R .  However, with perfect 
foresight the public can correctly anticipate that the central bank will eventually raise the 
nominal interest rate as a result of implementing a lower inflation target  1 π .  Because  this 
reduction in R will decrease the net marginal product of capital in the future,
12 the agents 
with perfect foresight will instantly decrease their demand for capital, and in turn the 
market price  q will also fall.  As a result, Figure 3 indicates that the rate of economic 
growth instantly decreases from  0
~ γ  to  + 0 γ .  
The anticipation of a future reduction in the inflation target also leads to a continuous 
fall in the demand for capital during the dates between 
+ 0  and 
− T .  The decumulation 
of capital will depress the economic growth rate until the date of policy implementation.  
However, on the other hand, the interest rate feedback rule (14) indicates that the 
pre-announced effect will induce the central bank to temporarily lower the nominal interest 
rate.  Thus, from 
+ 0 t o  
− T  both  R  and γ  fall monotonically, and the economy 
moves gradually from  + 0 Q  to  T Q , as shown by the arrows in Figure 3. 
Once the lower inflation target  1 π  is realized, there is a continuous rise in the 
nominal interest rate.  The persistent rise in the nominal interest rate means a persistent 
increase in the opportunity cost of holding money, thereby leading to a continuous 
reduction in the demand for money.    Consequently, the transactions cost rises.    Since the 
                                                 






( ( 1 [ R v R v R v ⋅ ′ + − φ φ  with respect to the 
nominal interest rate  R , the negative relationship is confirmed.        
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net marginal product of capital decreases due to the higher transactions cost, the rate of 
economic growth is further depressed.  Thus, the economic growth rate keeps on falling 
and the nominal interest rate starts to rise as the economy moves along the  ) ( 1 π SS  locus 
towards its new long-run equilibrium  1 Q . 
We summarize the above results as: 
 
Proposition 3:  In response to an anticipated permanent decrease in the inflation target, 
the transitional dynamics of the monetary equilibrium exhibits the following properties: 
(i)  Instantaneously, the growth rate of the open economy falls and the nominal interest 
rate remains unchanged; 
(ii)  In transition, the economic growth rate falls monotonically toward its new 
stationary value.  The nominal interest rate exhibits a mis-adjustment: it falls 
during the period between the policy’s announcement and its implementation and 
then starts to increase toward a higher new stationary value after the lower 
inflation target is realized; 
Note that Proposition 3 is also true if the central bank implements a passive monetary rule.     
It is in our interest to further explore the transitional dynamics of the inflation rate  π  
(which equals the depreciation rate  ε  given that the purchasing power parity (1) holds 
continuously).  From the interest rate parity  π π − = − R R
* *  in (2), we learn that the 
evolutionary process of the inflation rate  π  coincides with that of  R  at each instant in 
time.  By combining this with the results in Proposition 3, we know that, upon an 
anticipated permanent reduction in the inflation target, the inflation rate will exhibit 
mis-adjustment in transition and will rise in the long run.
13  Consequently, the rates of 
inflation and economic growth exhibit a positive relationship during the period between the 
policy’s announcement and its implementation.    Once the lower inflation target is realized, 
the rates of inflation and economic growth begin to be negatively correlated.  Such a 
negative correlation between  π  and γ   also prevails in the long run.     
                                                 
13 From (16a) we have the stationary relations  ) ~ ( ) ~ (
~
0 0 0 0 0 0 γ γ α π π α α γ π − + − + = R  and  + = 0 1
~
α R  
) ~ ( ) ~ ( 0 1 1 1 γ γ α π π α γ π − + −  corresponding to the target rates of inflation  0 π  and  1 π , respectively.  Under 
the initial condition,  0 0
~ π π =  and  0 0
~ γ γ = , the following relationship must hold: 
  π γ π α α γ γ α π π / ) ~ ~ ( / )
~ ~
( ~
1 0 0 1 1 1 − + − + = R R . 
Given  0 1
~ ~
R R >  and  0 1
~ ~ γ γ <  as stated in Proposition 3, the above relationship indicates that the new 
stationary rate of inflation  1
~ π   exceeds the new target rate of inflation  1 π .  
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The above results lead us to establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4:  In response to an anticipated permanent decrease in the inflation target, 
in the long run the relationship between the rates of inflation and economic growth is 
negative.    However, in the transition the relationship is   
(i)  positive during the period between the policy’s announcement and its 
implementation; 
(ii) negative after the new inflation target is realized. 
A corollary to Proposition 4 is that, under a nominal interest rate rule that feeds back to 
both inflation and economic growth, regardless of whether it is passive or active, there is a 
double-dividend in the price stability and economic growth expansion both in the 
transitional period and in the long run, if the central bank immediately (without 
pre-announcement) changes the inflation target.  However, if the central bank chooses to 
implement a pre-announced inflation target policy, the economy will face a tradeoff 
between price stability and economic growth prior to the date of the new inflation target 
being  realized.   
 
4.2 A change in the growth target with imperfect credibility   
The approach in the previous subsection can be easily applied to analyze the 
announcement effect of a change in  γ .  However, a more interesting issue is to explore 
the effect of a target policy regarding  γ  in the presence of the central bank’s credibility 
problem, to which we now turn.   
Indeed, the central bank’s policy often involves some kind of credibility problem and 
it has also received a considerable amount of attention in the literature (see, for instance, 
Calvo (1986), Drazen and Helpman (1988), Calvo and Végh (1993), Calvo and Drazen 
(1998), and Lahiri (2000, 2001).  There is a typical example in this context which is that 
the authorities in many countries often overstate the intended growth target and hence 
modify their announced policy in the future.  This leads to the authorities losing 
credibility in relation to their commitment, and thereby gives rise to the imperfect 
credibility problem.   
To shed light on this problem, three further assumptions are necessary: (i) at  0 = t , 
the policy authority announces it is raising the target rate of economic growth permanently 
from  0 γ  to a higher  1 γ ; (ii) due to the lack of credibility regarding the authority’s  
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commitment, the public, however, expects that after a certain period of time the 
policymaker will modify  1 γ   toward a lower level, say,  2 γ , which is considered here to be 
such that  0 2 1 γ γ γ > > ;
14 (iii) the public is uncertain about the precise timing of the policy 
modification,  p T , and has a subjective probability distribution regarding  p T  with its 
distribution function being given by  ) ( p T F .  To simplify the analysis without loss of 
generality, in line with Lahiri (2000), we assume that the distribution has a mass at 
* T .   
We first consider the case in which the public accurately expects the true credibility 
horizon, that is,  p T T =
* .  Under such a simplified situation, during the transition the 

















γ γ . (24) 
Figure 4 presents the economy’s dynamic response to the policy (24), in which the 
initial equilibrium  0 Q  is the same as that in the previous subsection.  Upon the policy 
change, the  ) ( 0 0 γ = R &  locus shifts downward to  ) ( 0 1 γ = R & , leaving the  0 = γ&  locus 
unchanged.
15    The intersection of loci  ) ( 0 1 γ = R &  and  0 = γ&   is at point  1 Q , with  γ  and 
R  being  1
~ γ  and  1
~
R , respectively.  Point  1 Q  is the reference point that governs the 
dynamic adjustment during the period of the temporary target rate of economic growth  1 γ .  
The  ) ( 1 γ SS   path is its corresponding saddle-path.    Once the growth target is modified to 
2 γ , the dynamic system will travel along the saddle path  ) ( 2 γ SS   in order for the system to 
be convergent.    The associated steady-state equilibrium is  2 Q , with the stationary rates of 
growth and nominal interest being  2
~ γ  and  2
~
R ,  respectively.   
As indicated in Figure 4, given different values of 
* T , the economy will have very 
different impact responses (more specifically, it will jump to a point located between points 
                                                 
14 We assume for simplicity that the public accurately expects that the modified level of the growth target is 
2 γ .  If we relax this assumption, the precise dynamic trajectory will depend on the true value of the 
modified growth target.    However, except for the discrete jump at the instant when the true modified growth 
target is revealed, the qualitative characteristics of the dynamic path will remain the same as in our analysis in 
this section. 
15 From (16) and (20), we know that under an active rule ( 1 > π α ) 0 ) 1 /( /
0 > − = ∂ ∂
= π α β γ
R R &  and 
0 / 0= ∂ ∂ = γ π & R .  
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A and B).  If 
* T  is larger, namely 
*
L T , then the economy will jump rightward to 
L Q
+ 0 , a 
point that is closer to point A.
16  By contrast, if 
* T  is smaller, namely 
*
S T , then the 
economy will jump rightward to 
S Q
+ 0 , a point that is closer to point B.  As  a  consequence, 
at instant 
+ 0  the nominal interest rate remains intact while the economic growth rate 
immediately leaps from  0
~ γ  to 
L
+ 0 γ  (or 
S
+ 0 γ ).  Intuitively speaking, under the gradualist 
monetary rule, the nominal interest rate will remain intact at the original level  ) (
~
0 0 + = R R  
at instant 
+ 0 .  However, with perfect foresight, the public correctly anticipates that, in 
response to the higher growth target  1 γ , the central bank will eventually reduce the 
nominal interest rate and that this will cause the net marginal product of capital to rise.  
Therefore, the agent will instantly increase his demand for capital.    This in turn will raise 
the market price of capital  q and cause the economic growth rate to instantly rise from 
0
~ γ  to  + 0 γ .   
It is interesting and worth emphasizing that the initial rise in the economic growth rate 
increases with the credibility horizon.  It follows from the interest rate feedback rule (14) 
that the initial boost in the economic growth rate induces the central bank to accelerate the 
reduction in the nominal interest rate.    This tends to reduce the opportunity cost of holding 
money and thus encourages money holdings.  As a result, the transactions costs decline 
and thus capital accumulation and the economic growth rate are given a boost.  
Graphically, during the dates between 
+ 0  and 
− * T , there is a continuous rise in the 
economic growth rate from 
L
+ 0 γ  (
S
+ 0 γ ) to 
L
T* γ  (
S
T* γ ) and a continuous fall in the nominal 
interest rate from  ) (
~
0 0 + = R R  to 
L
T R *  (
S
T R * ).  As indicated by the arrows in Figure 4, the 
economy proceeds along the unstable path linking the points 
L Q
+ 0  (
S Q
+ 0 ) and 
L
T Q *  (
S
T Q * ) to 
exactly reach the point 
L
T Q *  (
S
T Q * ) at 
* T t = . 
From 
+ * T  onward, for 
*
L T  (
*
S T ), the economy will travel along the saddle path 
) ( 2 γ SS  from  point 
L
T Q *  (
S
T Q * ) toward the new steady-state equilibrium  2 Q .  
Correspondingly, the economic growth rate to fall (rise) continuously toward  2
~ γ  while  the 
                                                 
16 We can find a critical credibility horizon  c T  such that the economic growth rate exhibits neither 
overshooting nor undershooting; that is, in response to  c T , the economy will jump to point C on impact.  
We refer to all  c T T >
*  as  a  long credibility horizon and to all  c T T <
*  as  a  short credibility horizon.  
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nominal interest rate will rise (fall) monotonically toward  2
~
R .  Evidently, for a different 
credibility horizon, the system will adjust exactly in the opposite  direction.  Intuitively,  for 
*
L T  (
*
S T ), at the moment of time 
+ * T , the economic growth rate is higher (lower) than the 
new target rate  2 γ .  According to (14), this will induce the central bank to raise (lower) 
the nominal interest rate.  Such a rise (decline) in  R  discourages (encourages) money 
holdings and thus leads to an increase (decrease) in the transactions cost.  Consequently, 
investment is discouraged (encouraged) and the economic growth rate declines (rises).  
Due to the gradualism of the monetary rule, such a dynamic adjustment will persist until 
the new stationary  )
~
, ~ ( 2 2 R γ  is  achieved.   
By comparing  )
~
, ~ ( 2 2 R γ  with  )
~
, ~ ( 0 0 R γ , the following proposition is established.   
 
Proposition 5:  In response to an incredible rise in the growth target, the transitional 
dynamics of the monetary equilibrium exhibits the following properties: 
(i) Instantaneously, the growth rate of the open economy rises while the nominal 
interest rate remains unchanged; moreover, over a long (short) credibility horizon, 
the economic growth rate overshoots (undershoots) its long-run response; 
(ii) In transition: 
(a). During the entire transition, the rates of economic growth and nominal interest 
exhibit a negative relationship; 
(b). During the dates before policy modification, the economic growth rate exhibits a 
mis-adjustment over a long credibility horizon, while over a short credibility 
horizon, the economic growth rate exhibits a monotonic rise; 
(c). From 
* T  onward, over a long (short) credibility horizon, the economic growth 
rate will continuously fall (rise) toward its higher new stationary value. 
Given that the evolutionary process of the inflation rate coincides with that of the 
nominal interest rate at each instant in time, from Proposition 5 we derive the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 6:    Under a nominal interest rate rule regime that feeds back to both inflation 
and economic growth, regardless of whether it is active or passive, in the event of an 
incredible growth target policy change, the rates of inflation and economic growth are 
negatively correlated in the long run. 
Propositions 5 and 6 together point out that, under a nominal interest rate rule that feeds  
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back to both inflation and economic growth, an increase in the growth target can in the long 
run lead to both price stability and higher economic growth. 
In terms of Figure 4, we show that the monetary authority always has incentives to 
overstate its intended growth target.    For this purpose, let us first consider a fully credible 
policy in which the policy authority announces at  0 = t  an immediate permanent rise in 
the growth target from  0 γ  to  2 γ .    Upon the shock, the economy initially jumps from  0 Q  
to point A in Figure 4 and thereafter converges along the  ) ( 2 γ SS  locus toward the new 
steady-state equilibrium  2 Q .  Although credible and incredible policies lead to the same 
long-run outcome, they actually bring out distinct transitional dynamics.  By comparing 
the adjustment paths corresponding to credible (the  2 0AQ Q  trajectory) and incredible 








+  trajectory), it is easily found 
that the economy enjoys higher growth during the entire transition period when the growth 
target policy is incredible.  Moreover, the longer the credibility horizon, the more the 
economy will profit from policy incredibility.    Thus, we have: 
 
Proposition 7:  In the absence of reputational costs, there are always incentives for the 
policy authority to overstate its intended growth target and implement an incredible policy, 
since the economy can thereby enjoy higher growth during the entire transition.   
Finally, we would like to remind readers that the above discussions proceed under the 
assumption that the public accurately predicts the true credibility horizon  p T .  If the 
precise date of policy modification  p T  differs from 
* T , the transitional dynamics 
becomes more complicated.  In the case where policy modification occurs prior to 
* T  
(i.e.  p T T >
* ), then the economy will jump from its unstable path and pass 
L Q + 0  (
S Q + 0 ) and 
L
T Q *  (
S
T Q * ) horizontally to  ) ( 2 γ SS  at that time.  Accordingly, the economic growth rate 
will instantly fall, leaving the nominal interest rate unchanged.  From then on, the 
economy will travel along  ) ( 2 γ SS  to asymptotically regain the steady state  2 Q .  As is 
evident from Figure 4, as long as the expectation error,  p T T −
* , is not too large, the 
dynamic adjustment from  p T   onward will be qualitatively the same as that in the  p T T =
*  
case.  In the case where 
* *
L T T =  and  p L T T −
*  is sufficiently large, then, following the 
instant fall in the economic growth rate, the economic growth rate will continuous rise and  
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the nominal interest rate will continuously fall until the new stationary state  )
~
, ~ ( 2 2 R γ  is 
reached.
17   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The existing literature that embodies the endogenous growth framework is still silent 
on the effect of nominal interest rate rules in an open economy.    In view of this, this paper 
sets up an endogenous growth model of an open economy in which the central bank 
implements a gradualist interest-rate rule with targets for inflation and economic growth.     
We show that under a passive rule the monetary equilibrium exists and is unique; 
moreover, it is locally determinate.  Under an active rule, the open economy either 
generates multiple equilibria or does not have any equilibrium.  If equilibria exist, the 
high-growth equilibrium is locally determinate while the low-growth equilibrium is a 
source.  Our results clearly differ from those in previous studies and hence provide new 
insights for policy implications.     
We have also shown, under a nominal interest rate rule that feeds back to both 
inflation and economic growth, that regardless of whether it is passive or active, an 
immediate rise in the inflation target stabilizes the price level and promotes economic 
growth both in the transitional period and in the long run.  Nevertheless, under a 
pre-announced inflation target policy, price stability and the expansion of economic growth 
cannot be achieved simultaneously during the period between the policy’s announcement 
and its implementation.  We also show that, under such an interest rate rule, a higher 
growth target has a favorable effect on both inflation and economic growth in the long run.   
In addition, the policy authority always has incentives to overstate its intended growth 
target and hence will implement an incredible policy.    The credibility of the central bank’s 
commitment is shown to play an important role in influencing the transitional dynamics of 
the macroeconomic variables. 
                                                 
17 By contrast, when  p T T <
* , then at time 
* T  the public will modify its expectations to a longer 
credibility horizon.  To save space, this paper does not discuss this situation.  Detailed discussions are 
available from the authors  upon  request.    
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